Introduction

The Cuban Missile Crisis, a pivotal event in the history of the Cold War, unfolded as a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, with Cuba serving as the location of the crisis. The discovery of nuclear missiles in Cuba sparked this intense standoff, but the root cause can be traced back to the United States' deployment of missiles in Turkey and its ongoing hostility towards Cuba.

There are several misconceptions and biases that have shaped the understanding of this crisis.

Biases towards viewing the crisis as a result of Soviet aggression and expansionism, while downplaying US actions, have influenced interpretations of the crisis.

Additionally, biases towards portraying President Kennedy as the hero who successfully resolved the crisis, while downplaying the role of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, have skewed perceptions of the crisis.

Finally, there remains the troubling question of whether Khrushchev was correct in his gamble. Was aggressive nuclear posturing the only method by which he could extract nuclear missiles from Turkey? Were nuclear weapons the only way that he could prevent Cuba from further invasions by the United States? My answer to this question is the profound warning Adlai Stevenson, then US ambassador to the United Nations, gave president John F. Kennedy during the crisis: “To start or risk starting a nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best, and the judgments of history rarely coincide with the tempers of the moment...” (Stevenson, 1962, as quoted in Kornbluh, 2022).

This essay will examine the events leading up to and during the crisis, explore the motives and strategies of the different actors in the crisis, and address the misconceptions and biases regarding this critical event in the history of the Cold War.

Castro's Motives

United States' Attacks on Communist Cuba

The goals of Cuba were simpler and more critical compared to the other two powers; Castro wanted a way to deter any further incursions of the US against Cuba and wanted provide economic relief to his people.
After successfully overthrowing the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, Fidel Castro declared Cuba as a communist state. The United States response to Castro's new communist government was hostile to say the least, imposing economic sanctions on Cuba and attempting to invade it militarily.

Economic Sanctions Against Cuba

The trade embargo would begin in 1960 after a trade deal between Cuba and the Soviet Union caused US oil companies to refuse to refine USSR oil, prompting Castro to nationalize all US oil plants and US property, in addition to actively discouraging imports from the US(Krinsky and Golove, 1993). The embargo would increase in it restrictions, and would reach its strictest form after John F. Kennedy's Proclamation 3447, which declared in February of 1962 a total US trade embargo on Cuba (Kennedy, 1962). The embargo was intended to pressure Cuba to adopt a democratic and non-communist economic and political system that protected US interests in Cuba, but it also had the effect of pushing Cuba closer to the Soviet Union.

Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba

The US attempt to invade Cuba to overthrow Fidel Castro in 1961. On April 17, the Cuban-exile invasion force, known as Brigade 2506, landed at beaches along the Bay of Pigs and immediately came under heavy fire by pro-Castro Cuban forces. Cuban planes strafed the invaders, sank their ships, and destroyed half of the exile's air support. On April 19, US support aircraft was shot down at they attempted to relieve pressure off ground troops (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, n.d.). The invasion was crushed by Castro's forces, but the invasion had unintended side effects that the US did not foresee. The failed invasion convinced Castro that the US would attempt to invade Cuba again in the future, and it made seek a method by which to deter any thought of invasion. When the Soviet Union offered Nuclear weapons, Castro was happy to accept.

Khrushchev Motives for Sending Missiles to Cuba

The Soviet Union aimed to establish a strategic deterrent against the US in response to the US's nuclear missiles in Turkey and Italy, and to strengthen its position in the Cold War by challenging US dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's goals were three-fold: first, the missiles would be a deterrent to the US against any potential future invasions of Cuba, the Soviet's communist ally; second, the missiles in Cuba were geographically strategic as they were a potential retaliation measure for the US missiles in Turkey; and third, the missiles would increase Soviet prestige in the Western hemisphere by demonstrating that the Soviets can negotiate with imperialist nations from a position of power.

Defend Communist Cuba against Imperialist United States

Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the Cuban revolution as a fledgling version of the Bolshevik communist revolution, and, like the Bolshevik communists, Cuban communists suffered incessant harassment by the United States. Khrushchev stated that “The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet prestige in that part of the world preoccupied me” (Gaddis, 2006) The Soviet Union's prestige as a world power and communism's survival in Latin America were in question.

Khrushchev expressed this point to Kennedy during the crisis, writing that he provided economic and military aid to Cuba because “…At one time, our people itself had a revolution when Russia was still a backward country. We were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure...” (Khrushchev, 1962, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010) Khrushchev's accusation of the United States as the aggressor in this crisis is grounded in history, and his assessment of the Cuban situation is accurate.

By October 14, 1962, United States' U-2 spy planes would photograph nuclear ballistic missiles at multiple sites in Cuba, and Kennedy would be briefed on this alarming finding on October 16, 1962.

Compensate for US Nuclear Superiority

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a direct result of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries had been rapidly developing and deploying nuclear weapons, leading to a dangerous escalation of tensions that could lead to a nuclear war. The crisis highlighted the struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the powerful military and political bargaining power of nuclear weapons.

Starting in 1957 under the Eisenhower administration, the US deployed seventeen intermediate-range Jupiter missiles in Turkey. This alarmed Khrushchev as he saw it as a clear threat by the United States against the Soviets. Khrushchev was provoked into giving “them [the US] back some of their own medicine”. (Dallek, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010) Khrushchev was now keenly aware of the nuclear superiority that the US had over the Soviet Union, and was adamant in finding a way to shift the bridge the missile gap. He identifies the challenges of this task in his memoirs: “Our potential enemy [ the United States]…was so far away from us that…Only by building up a nuclear missile force could we keep the enemy from unleashing war against us.” (Zubok, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010) Khrushchev wanted to remove the missiles from Turkey, and his approach was based on his belief that the US would only respond to a show of force. Khrushchev did not intend on war, but, as Dallek states in "Khrushchev's "New Look": Brinksmanship and Bluff ", he was convinced that the US would negotiate only when the US was faced with "Either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history." (Zubok, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010)

Ironically, it was this very strategy of "Nuclear Brinksmanship" (Zubok, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010) that almost plunged the world into a massive nuclear conflict in 1962.

The Crisis

Kennedy's naval quarantine and Broadcast

On October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy is informed of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. His first response was confusion, as he did not expect the Soviet Union to act so brashly. Despite his aggressive front, Khrushchev had proven to Kennedy to be cautious in dealing with United States. Kennedy states in his meeting with advisors that "he’s [Khrushchev] been cautious" (Kennedy, 1962, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010).

Kennedy's response was the characteristic mix of diplomacy and force he was known for. After considering three plans of action proposed to him by on his exCOMM advisors McNamara, Kennedy decided on initiating a naval quarantine and a television broadcast, despite McNamara stating that diplomatic means would not prove useful (McNamara, 1962, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010).

On October 22, Kennedy addressed the nation, declared the US decision to impose a naval quarantine of Cuba against further Soviet shipments of any kind, and called on Khrushchev to take initiative to resolve the critical situation by diplomatic means, implying that the US is willing to negotiate. Kennedy reveals in his speech a critical awareness of the devastation that can be caused by nuclear weapons, stating that "We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril." (Kennedy, 1962, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010) After declaring a "quarantine" on all shipments entering Cuba, but extended an olive branch to the Cubans and Soviets by allowing shipments of "necessities of life." Kennedy then calls on Khrushchev to take the initiative to broker a peace between the two nations, stating that "He has an opportunity now to move the world back from
the abyss of destruction—by returning to his Government’s own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba...and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions."

Kennedy was anxious for a diplomatic Khrushchev ready to negotiate, and there was great doubt as to whether Khrushchev would be willing to negotiate.

Khrushchev's Letters

On October 26, 1962, sent a letter to Kennedy offering to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for a pledge by the United States to refrain from invading Cuba in the future. Khrushchev pointed out the reality of his grievances regarding US policy towards Cuba, stating that "It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack...has constantly hung...over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban government to furnish it [with]
aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country" (Khrushchev, 1962, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010) Khrushchev insisted that he receive a pledge from Kennedy that the US would not attempt to invade Cuba again.

On October 27, Khrushchev sent another letter stating that he would remove Soviet missiles from Cuba if Kennedy removed US missiles from Turkey. It is noteworthey that Kennedy did not offer to remove these missiles in exchange for the Cuban missiles, perhaps ouf his deterimination to appear uncompromising in the face of Soviet aggression. It was only Adlai Stevenson, then US ambassador to the United Nations, who strongly advised the president to trade the Jupiter missiles in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba, stating that "The existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything.” (Stevenson, 1962 as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010)

Khrushchev's unexpected letters and Stevenson's level-headed advice convinced Kennedy to accept this offer because the alternative was nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Although the official documents state that Kennedy rejected Stevenson's suggestion, Kennedy's actions proved otherwise.

Misconceptions

Two main misconceptions I want to tackle are the view that the Soviets were solely responsible for the crisis due to Khrushchev's provocative deployment of missiles to Cuba and the unilateral praise of Kennedy as the hero who diplomatically resolved the conflict.

As for Soviet blame for the crisis, Khrushchev's initial brazen decision to send missiles to Cuba was mediated by his letters that negotiated their removal. He sought to avoid a nuclear military conflict with the US, and did not directly challenge the US naval quarantine. Additionally, were it not for the US Jupiter missiles in Turkey, it is arguable whether Khrushchev would be inclined to station his missiles in Cuba. US harassment of Cuba must also not be neglected in an assessment of the actors responsible for the crisis; had diplomatic relations existed between Cuba and the United States, Castro would not be as brazen as to accept Soviet nuclear missiles, which are certain to provoke a response from the US. Finally, it was Adlai Stevenson who proposed the idea of the missile exchange, which Kennedy reportedly rejected during the exCOMM meetings (Paterson, 2010).

Credit, however, must be attributed to Kennedy for his eventual acceptance of Stevenson's plan to accept the Soviet offer for missile exchange. Additionally, his call on Khrushchev during his national address created a way for the Soviet Union to negotiate peacefully. His initial decision to be uncompromising with the Soviets subsided to diplomacy, demonstrating an appreciation for what was at stake during the crisis.

Controversy

Khrushchev's Gamble

It is difficult to say whether other methods of negotiation would have convinced the United States to remove their missiles from Turkey or end their military invasions of Cuba. It is unfortunate that the reality is that Khrushchev's gamble had indeed succeeded in achieving his goal of frightening the United States into cooperation and negotiation; the US did not invade Cuba after the crisis and they removed their missiles from Turkey. Khrushchev famously stated that “it is impossible to win this war...", referring to a nuclear war, and that "the missiles have one purpose—to scare them, to restrain them..."(Dallek, as quoted in Merrill and Paterson, 2010). However, had Khrushchev anticipated a military response from the US, his statement "it is impossible to win this war" suggests that he would have not attempted such a dangerous move.

Castro's Prophecy

Unlike the Soviet Union who could retreat across the Atlantic and who felt safe with their nuclear forces at home, Cuba would be left to face the United States alone after the crisis. This fact is important to note because it changes our perception of Fidel Castro from a warmonger who urged the Soviet Union to initiate the first attack to a state leader who, according to his letter to Khrushchev on October 26 during the crisis, wanted to protect his nation " through an act of clear legitimate defense...however harsh and terrible the solution would be, for there is no other." (Castro, 1962) Indeed, Fidel Castro's October 31st letter to Khrushchev detailing his prediction of United States' post-crisis intentions towards Cuba would prove prophetic:"The Imperialists ate talking once again of invading our country...", the Cuban leader stated, "which is proof of how ephemeral and untrustworthy their promises are." (Castro, 1962) The United States would continue with their assassination plots all the way up to 1965.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a complex event that involved multiple actors with their own motives and strategies. It is important to challenge the misconceptions and biases that have shaped our understanding of this crisis.

Castro's motives were driven by the United States' attacks on communist Cuba, including economic sanctions and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. His goal was to deter any further incursions and provide economic relief to his people.

Khrushchev's motives were to establish a strategic deterrent against the US, compensate for US nuclear superiority, and defend communist Cuba against US aggression. He saw the missiles in Cuba as a way to challenge US dominance in the Western Hemisphere and protect the Soviet Union's prestige.

Kennedy's response to the crisis was a mix of diplomacy and force. While he is often portrayed as the hero who resolved the crisis, it was Adlai Stevenson who proposed the idea of a missile exchange, which Kennedy eventually accepted. Kennedy's acceptance of this offer and his call for peaceful negotiations demonstrated an appreciation for the gravity of the situation.

The crisis was not solely the fault of the Soviets, as US actions and harassment of Cuba played a significant role. The removal of US missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba was a fair and reasonable solution.

In the end, Khrushchev's gamble succeeded in achieving his goals without a nuclear war. However, it is difficult to say whether other methods of negotiation would have been successful. What is certain is that Khrushchev's gamble, regardless of US actions to provoke him and Castro, posed a greater risk to the Soviet Union and the world than it could ever benefit them. As Adlai Stevenson warned during the crisis, "the judgments of history rarely coincide with the tempers of the moment". We are fortunate that the tempers of those moments in October 1962 were adeptly managed through diplomatic means, and we are privileged to be able to examine the events through a critical and unbiased approach to help us understand the context of those events.

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